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Balancing Social and Political Strategies in Emerging Markets: 
Evidence from India 
Abstract 
This article explores the substitution and complementary effects between political and social 
strategies on firm performance in the context of an emerging market (EM). Using in-depth, 
historical case-study approach, the article investigates how companies integrate political and 
social resources in this market. Corporate performance includes traditional measures such as 
accounting performance and nonfinancial measures like the ease of doing business. The study 
finds that social strategies are stronger enablers of firm long-term performance than political 
strategies. The latter have a short-term impact on performance, but their success over time is 
limited. The main drawback of reliance on political resources in EMs is the lack of political 
stability, fragmented polity, and weak political coalitions. We identify rather limited evidence 
of firms using these two strategies as complements. Thus, we suggest that firms should 
employ both these strategies in the EM. 
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political strategies, social strategies, non-market strategies, emerging market, India. 
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In this article, we examine the impact of political and social strategies on firm 
performance in the contex of emerging markets (EMs)- utilizing the context of one of the 
largest emerging market of India. Recently, there has been an increasing interest in 
understanding the drivers and outcomes of political and social strategies (e.g., Frynas & 
Stephens, 2015; Frynas et al., 2017; Mellahi et al., 2016). Political strategies consist of 
engagement with policymakers, targeting these stakeholders via constituency building, 
sharing information and financial resources (Hillman and Wan, 2005). Social strategies 
include activities directed towards ethical management and responsible engagement with the 
business context (Clarkson, 1995, Gupta et al., 2017; Li et al., 2018).   
Given the growing interest in this topic (cf. Holtbrügge et al., 2007, Mellahi et al., 
2016; Puck et al., 2013), scholarly investigations in this area are relatively underdeveloped 
and fragmented. Most of the studies on political strategies (Lawton et al., 2013) and social 
strategies (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012) are conducted in isolation and scholars have called for 
the integration of these two strands of research (McWilliams et al., 2002, Frynas & Stephens, 
2015; Mellahi et al., 2016). The current lack of integration of political and social strategies 
research means that there is limited understanding of complementary or substitution effects 
between the political and social strategies (cf. Leidong et al., 2017; Mellahi et al., 2016).  In 
the context of EMs, extant literature has examined the different types of political and social 
strategies used by  foreign companies in those markets, mainly focusing on the determinants 
of such strategies rather than on the outcomes (Meznar & Nigh, 1995, Oliver & Holzinger, 
2008, Hillman & Hitt, 1999, Hillman et al., 2004).  Oliver and Holzinger (2008) highlight 
how non-market strategies rather than market ones can be sources of firm competitive 
advantage. The implementation of political strategies can impact firm outcomes. For 
example, it can achieve favourable legislative decisions (Lord, 2000), generate higher market 
capitalisation (Hillman, 2005), improve the firm value in stock markets (Goldman et al., 




2009), lead to enhanced financial performance (Shaffer et al., 2000), and decrease business 
risk (Puck et al., 2013). Yet, there is limited work exploring the links between socio-political 
strategies and their influence on firm performance in EMs (e.g., Leidong et al., 2017; Frynas 
& Stephens, 2015; Hadani & Coombes, 2015). 
Though above and several other studies have provided important insights into the 
antecedents of political and social strategies (cf.., Frynas et al., 2017; Mellahi et al., 2016), 
however, majority of the work has been conducted in developed markets and scholars have 
called for more research in the context of EMs where formal institutions are still evolving 
(e.g., Hadani & Coombes, 2015; Lawton et al., 2013; Doh et al., 2012; Jamali et al., 2017). 
Besides this, studies are also rare which have simultaneously examined the political and 
social strategies undertaken by MNEs and domestic firms and the outcome of such strategies 
in EMs context (e.g., Liedong et al., 2017).  Thus, it is imperative to investigate both foreign 
and domestic firms to develop a fine-grained view of their chosen political and social 
strategies and better understand whether these strategies have a different impact on the 
performance of foreign vis-a-vis domestic firms (Scherer et al., 2014, Frynas & Stephens, 
2015).  
Political and social strategies can be particularly important in EMs since these markets suffer 
from institutional voids (cf. Khanna et al., 2005). Though multinational enterprises (MNEs) 
from developed countries have been investing in emerging markets (EMs) for over a couple 
of centuries, systematic and strategic investment in these EMs has been largely driven by 
their notable economic growth and development. Though EMs have experienced rapid 
economic development, their institutional systems are still widely underdeveloped (Shirodkar 
and Mohr, 2015). Accordingly, these institutional limitations, called “institutional voids” 
(Khanna et al., 2005), create unpredictable “non-market” environment for foreign firms 
elucidating high socio-political risks. Hence, foreign firms adopt different types of strategy 
and ownership structures, which are favourable in EM contexts (Contractor et al., 2014). 




MNEs operating in EM also need to strategically shape their interaction with non-market 
actors, including non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to establish legitimacy (Shaffer & 
Hillman, 2000, Bansal &Hunter, 2003, Reimann et al., 2012). This also helps them influence 
government officials (Doh, Lawton, Rajwani & Paroutis, 2014; Lawton, Doh, & Rajwani, 
2014). At the same time, domestic firms need to articulate their strategies so that they can 
develop strategies in response to local institutional voids as well as compete with MNEs that 
might have superior products and services (Guillen, 2000). Domestic firms might have 
superior information on local issues by their virtue of access to local knowledge and better 
alignment with domestic challenges. Whereas a growing stream of research has argued that 
social strategies are institutionally bound (Jamali & Karam, 2016; Frynas & Yamahaki, 2016; 
Jamali & Neville, 2011; Jamali et al., 2017), there is sparse research on how firms engage in 
socio-political activities to manage their operations in EMs. Moreover, knowledge about the 
comparative difference between the socio-political activities of EM and developed market 
firms is limited (Jamali & Carroll, 2017). 
When multinational enterprises (MNEs) invest in EMs where public governance 
systems are weak, they are stepping in to fill governance voids, and are increasingly adopting 
both political and corporate social responsibility (CSR) strategies (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; 
Teegen et al., 2004). Research indicates that MNEs engage in political and social strategies in 
host markets to develop institutional legitimacy that can help them improve their performance 
(McWilliams et al., 2006, Khan et al., 2015).   
Based on the above discussion, we address the following three interrelated research 
questions: (1) Do political and social strategies have an impact on corporate performance? (2)  
Are there substitution and complementary effects between political and social strategies? and 
(3) Do political and social strategies impact vary in the short and long-term? To examine 
these research questions, we integrate institutional theory (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Kostova 
& Roth, 2002, North, 1990) with the literature on political and social strategies (cf. Mellahi et 




al., 2016). Institutional theorists have shown that compliance with institutional pressures, 
including social and political issues, leads to performance and survival benefits (Bansal & 
Roth, 2000; Baum & Oliver, 1991; Deephouse, 1996; Suchman, 1995). Since transaction 
costs arise due to weak and incomplete institutions in EMs, firms may transform and capture 
the institutions through corporate political activities in order to develop competitive 
advantage (Dorobantu, Kaul & Zelner, 2017; Doh et al., 2012). This aspect is rarely captured 
by the existing non-market strategy studies thus our study provides important insights to the 
current literature on this topic.  
Using the longitudinal case-study approach, this research takes a process view on 
integration and sustenance of non-market strategies. We find that in the long run social 
strategies undertaken in EMs place firms in a much better position to improve performance 
and establish legitimacy compared to political strategies. Political strategies may have a 
short-term impact on improving firm performance. Hence, firms need to adjust these 
strategies carefully by examining the short vs. long-term performance and legitimacy trade-
off, particularly in the context of EMs.  
We make three key contributions to the discourse on political and social strategies in 
EMs.  First, we integrate the fragmented research on political and social strategies and 
provide a more fine-grained view on their adoption in EMs. Second, we examine both 
political and social strategies together and the complementary and substitutions effects of 
these strategies. Third, we provide contextually bound rich insights from one of the key big 
emerging markets – India (e.g., Scherer et al., 2014) thus add to the limited research which 
has examined both these strategies in EMs. 
 
Conceptual Background and Propositions 




Institutional Basis for Political and Social Strategies 
Institutions have been defined as “the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction” (North, 1990: 3), and include both formal aspects such as rules and laws, as well 
as more informal aspects such as cultural norms. Institutions have also been identified with a 
regulative, normative, and cultural-cognitive pillar (Scott, 1995, 2008). The regulative pillar 
relates to formal rules-based systems such as laws and government enforced regulations on 
businesses (North, 1990, Scott, 1995). Regulative institutional enforcement mechanisms 
require that firms should comply with social norms and report their strategic social initiatives 
transparently and openly to the public (Campbell, 2007, Kostova & Roth, 2002, Doh & Guay, 
2006). For example, firms in India are now required to spend around 2% of their profit on 
CSR initiatives. On the other hand, normative and cognitive rules are embedded in the 
individuals and groups within a country and might be hard for firms to interpret (Demirbag, 
Glaister & Tatoglu, 2007). In the context of EMs, these pillars have been identified as being 
different from those observed in the developed countries (Demirbag et al.,  2007). Scholars 
have argued that due to lack of or weak regulative pillar, norms and cultural mechanisms play 
a greater role in managing business activities in EMs (Perez-Batres, Miller  & Pisani, 2010, 
Peng, 2003).  
Having said that, the impact of both political and social strategies on firm 
performance is not clear (cf. Hadani and Coombes, 2015; Mellahi et al., 2016), and both 
strategies have been hardly investigated together, especially in the context EMs.  Scholars 
note that institutions effect the political and social strategies adopted by MNEs in host 
markets, especially in EM contexts (e.g., Doh & Guay, 2006; Jamali, 2010; Jamali & Karam, 
2016; Khan et al., 2015). MNEs may face a challenge when it comes to adjusting both 
political and social strategies in those contexts as these markets encounter institutional voids 
which put additional pressures on MNEs to adopt balancing strategies (e.g., Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997, 2010).  




Scholars have indicated that firms conform to local institutional environments of host 
nations to establish legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). This implies that firms align their 
political and social strategies, considering the formal and informal institutions in host markets 
(Kostova & Zaheer, 1999; Khan et al., 2015).  For instance, Meznar and Nigh (1995) 
highlight how CSR strategies have been used by American companies to buffer social 
environment and generate strategies which address the needs and concerns of the social 
constituents of these firms. Recent studies have also looked at domestic firm activities and 
related these to political and social strategies (Li et al., 2018). 
In the case of EMs, formal institutions are in a state of flux, emerging and evolving, 
as these markets are moving away from command-based to market-oriented arrangements. 
Consequntly,  in order to fully capture the political and social strategies of firms in EMs, 
integrating both formal and informal institutions is important (Husted & Allen, 2006; Khanna 
et al., 2005).  
Below we explore political and social strategies of MNEs in EMs along with the role 
of institutions  in order to provide the conceptual foundations for the empirical part of the 
article. 
Political and Social Strategies in Emerging Economies 
Emerging markets present a unique set of political and social strategy challenges for firms 
(Visser, 2008; Khan et al., 2015; Jamali et al., 2017), as these markets are characterized by 
institutional voids and difficulties that the state faces in solving complex societal problems 
(Khanna & Palepu, 1997, 2010). As a result, firms might adopt a different set of political and 
social strategies to establish legitimacy in such markets (Bansal & Hunter, 2003, Chapple & 
Moon, 2005; Gao & Hafsi, 2017). For example, Chapple and Moon (2005) have noted 
variations of social strategies being adopted by firms in the EMs of Asia.  
The regulatory uncertainties and institutional distance affect the political strategies of 
MNEs, and in the Chinese context, firms tend to actively engage in political strategies when 




regulatory uncertainties are high (Mondejar &Zhao, 2013). Other studies on political 
connections in China have shown that political connections are not always fruitful, especially 
in the long run (Li et al., 2008), and some evidence suggests a link between corruption in 
EMs and the adoption of political strategies (Lawton et al., 2013). Moreover, regime change 
can have an enormous impact on the political capital and social strategies adopted by firms. 
In the case of Indonesia, for example, political relationship with politicians who were part of 
the Suharto regime became a liability for firms in the post-Suharto years (Dieleman & 
Boddewyn, 2012). 
Against this backdrop, the role of institutions is imperative in influencing firm 
behaviour and choice in adopting political over social strategies or vice versa strategies in 
host markets (Hamann, 2006; Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Marquis & Raynard, 2015). The 
more widely used corporate political strategies (CPS) framework was provided by Hillman 
and Hitt (1999) and Hillman et al. (2004). They argue that as political environment becomes 
more complex and influential, companies that engage in strategic political strategies are more 
likely to build their competitive advantage than firms that are less engaged or politically inert 
(Rajwani & Liedong, 2015). This is especially pertinent for EMs where the political 
environment is relatively unstable and dynamic when compared to developed countries. 
Hillman and Hitt (1999) presented a political strategy typology which consisted of three 
strategies – information-based, financial incentive, and constituency building. In their study, 
Shirodkar and Mohr (2015) have found that the choices of foreign firms are driven by the 
tangible and intangible nature of resources. Their study examined the strategy of 105 foreign 
subsidiaries in India and found that foreign firms’ dependence on local intangible resources 
impelled them to use information-based political strategies, whereas, the dependence on local 
tangible resources implied less use of information-based political strategies. At the same 
time, when firms depended on both tangible and intangible assets, they were more likely to 
use the constituency building strategy.  




Research indicates that political connections influence firms’ adoption of political and 
social strategies in host markets (Rajwani & Liedong, 2015). Some studies have also noted 
that political connections impact positively MNEs’ responses to pressures regarding CSR 
practices in EMs (Marquis & Qian, 2014). However, we have a limited understanding of 
whether political and social strategies impact firm performance differently (Rajwani & 
Liedong, 2015). The nature of regulative pressures would also influence whether firms will 
adopt substantive or symbolic political and social strategies (Marquis and Qian, 2014). By 
responding to the regulative pressures and adopting political and social strategies, firms will 
develop local legitimacy (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999, Reimann et al., 2012, Gifford et al., 
2010). This also suggests that the regulative pressure determines the extent to which firms 
will pursue political and social strategies (Husted & Allen, 2006). Firms in EMs may 
influence formal institutions through corporate political strategies to manage socio-political 
risks (Jimenez, 2010; Sun et al., 2010; Doh et al., 2012).    
The weak regulative institutional environment, which is prevalent in EMs (Khanna & 
Palepu, 1997, 2010), may force firms to adopt symbolic instead of substantive social 
strategies due to the ineffectiveness of the government to enforce rules and laws (Husted & 
Allen, 2006, Marquis & Qian, 2014). Due to institutional voids, governments in these 
countries have often come under criticism for providing favours and unnecessary incentives 
and turning their countries into pollution heavens to attract foreign investment (Campbell, 
2007, Javorcik & Wei, 2004). Under these circumstances, firms may interpret and comply 
with rules and laws differently in EMs, while implementing political and social strategies 
compared to firms based in developed markets where the formal institutions are mature 
(Marquis et al., 2007; Marquis & Raynard, 2015). Echoing these concerns, Campbell (2007: 
954) notes that, under weak regulations, corporations “seek to control or otherwise capture 
regulators in ways that bend them towards the will of the corporations they are supposed to 
oversee.”   




The normative institutions include set of guidelines and norms determining what is 
right to do (Marquis et al., 2007) in the host market context. Firms will adopt social strategies 
to conform to the established social norms (Campbell, 2007, Doh & Guay, 2006, Reimann et 
al., 2012; Jamali et al., 2017) and achieve higher corporate performance (López, Garcia & 
Rodriguez, 2007). In markets where the regulative institutional pillar is weak, we may 
observe firms choosing both social and political strategies to enhance their performance 
(Frynas & Stephens, 2015; Khan et al., 2015).  The cognitive institutional element consists of 
the social beliefs and values that guide behaviour in a social context. The prevalent culture in 
a society will determine the extent to which firms based in such markets will adopt political 
and social strategies (Reimann et al., 2012, Campbell, 2007). Firms responding to these 
cognitive pressures will adopt social strategies that align with societal expectation and culture 
(Agarwal et al., 2017). For example, the existing political and social responsibility literature 
highlights that firms are acting independently, as well as aligning with multiple stakeholders 
such as NGOs, and are undertaking activities such as public health, education, social security 
and human rights protection in order to address local governments’ failure to address these 
societal problems (Mena and Palazzo, 2012, Van Huijstee and Glasbergen, 2010, Scherer & 
Palazzo, 2011). 
Research suggests that companies that engage with political strategies are in a better 
position to improve their performance and competitive advantage compared to those that do 
not or are less engaged in such strategies (e.g., Hillman & Hitt, 2009; Hillman et al., 2004; 
Rajwani & Liedong, 2015). For instance, scholars have noted that adoption of political 
strategies can improve firm performance in a umber of ways, such as achieving favourable 
legislative decisions (Lord, 2000), generating higher market capitalisation (Hillman, 2005) or 
better stock value (Goldman et al., 2009), improving their financial performance (Shaffer et 
al., 2000), as well lowering business risk in the host market (Puck et al., 2013). However, 
there are limited studies that have examined the effectiveness of corporate political and social 




responsibility activities in different contexts, including those of EMs (e.g., Lawton et al., 
2013; Doh et al., 2012), which in this study we endeavour to unpack.  
Since most of the formal institutions are still weak in EMs (Shirodkar & Mohr, 2015), 
the performance gains from political strategies might be short-term, as informal institutional 
pressure will force firms to adopt strategic social strategies, and the legitimacy gained 
through these strategies will enhance the long-term performance of the firms (Husted & 
Allen, 2006; Gao & Hafsi, 2017).  This discussion suggests that we may observe a varying 
impact of political and social strategies on firm performance, as it depends on the institutional 
context.  
Based on the above discussion, we suggest that:  
In EMs, firms adopting political strategies will materialize short-term performance 
gains compared to firms adopting social strategies. Secondly, we argue that in EMs, firms 
adopting social strategies conforming to the normative and cultural cognitive institutional 
pillars will achieve higher long-term performance compared with firms adopting political 
strategies only. Moreover, in EM due to political fragmentation and the lack of institutional 
stability, firms using political strategies will experience adverse effects of these strategies on 
their long-term corporate performance. The conceptual model based on our literature review 
is shown in Figure 1.  
(Insert Figure 1 here) 
 
Research Context and Methodology 
Research context 
The Indian EM context is an ideal setting for this study because of its highly dynamic 
political and social environment (Shirodkar & Mohr, 2015). The government is still a major 
stakeholder in the business landscape. The collective interests of Indian firms are represented 
by the Federation of the Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry (FICCI), whereas, those 




of foreign firms are represented by the Associated Chambers of Commerce (Assocham) 
(Kochanek, 1996). In addition, Indian NGOs are relatively free and independent of 
governmental control and provide oversight for the civil society with regards to corporate 
activities in India, including corporate fraud, industrial misappropriation or misuse of natural 
resources. Indian NGOs work with or alongside int rnational NGOs to build people’s agency 
and activism in Indian grassroots (Kapoor, 2005). Overall, these arguments suggest that India 
is an interesting setting for investigating the balancing role of non-market strategies on 
corporate performance.    
Research methodology  
The historical analysis method is widely used in historical studies to gain a better 
understanding of a social phenomenon and has been increasingly used in longitudinal 
research in international business (Birkinshaw, Brannen & Tung, 2011; Burgelman, 2011, 
Kotabe & Kothari, 2016). Longitudinal case studies are principally suitable for handling 
“why” and “how” research questions to theorize about the causal mechanism (Langley, 1999, 
Yin, 2008), and in this paper we focus principally on the relationship between the key 
elements in our study, namely, the non-market strategies and firm performance.  
This methodology is also suited for understanding the nuances of why particular 
processes occur under a specific set of circumstances. To achieve these objectives of locating 
atypical or interesting examples, which help researchers understand the processes being 
studied, Eisenhardt (1989) suggests using extreme cases, whereas, Yin (2008) recommends 
the use of revelatory cases. These two methods are suggested as they help identify the 
phenomenon of interest more transparently.  Thus, the study of non-market strategies in EM 
requires a historical analysis of data from various sources and the examination of a complex 
and latent institutional context present in the home and host markets.  
We chose a multiple-case historical analysis approach as our research design as 
having multiple cases provides a better feel for diversity of strategies and can lead to future 




generalizations from our research (Marschan-Piekkari & Welch, 2004; Piekkari, Welch & 
Paavilainen 2009). Using multiple case studies allows us to explore the phenomenon through 
the use of replication strategy and is akin to conducting some independent experiments on the 
same issue (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007). In this study, we carried out an in-depth analysi 
of twelve events involving six Indian and six foreign companies operating in India. 
Eisenhardt (1989) suggests that an optimal number of cases must be above four and below 
ten. As we are looking at two different types of home countries (developed and emerging-
market), we chose six cases for each type of home country context. 
Data collection  
The study adopted a purposive sampling technique to identify the suitable cases (Krippedorff, 
2004). The key benefit of purposive sampling is the development of information-rich cases 
for in-depth analysis. Before the selection of these twelve cases, on original list of cases was 
created by working with a team of four participants not involved in this project. This team 
consisted of two industry consultants and two academics with a history of research in the 
Indian context. Each of these participants was asked to create a list of events involving 
domestic and foreign firms in India which presented a key challenge to the firm and 
demonstrated their use of non-market strategies. The case selection had to follow two other 
underlying criteria – 1) each event had to have had significant coverage in the popular trade 
press, 2) to allow triangulation between the material in the press and on company websites, as 
we expected these events to be also reported in company reports or websites.  
Once we had the individual list of these independent participants, we compiled a 
cumulative list of cases. At this stage, the inter-rater reliability score using Cohen’s kappa 
was 0.7 (Fleiss, 1981). Following this process, a total of 23 cases were identified for Indian 
companies (23 cases involving 15 unique Indian companies) and 11 cases for foreign 
companies operating in India (11 cases involving nine unique foreign companies). Next, we 
asked these four independent participants to rank the events in order of their complexity and 




impact on firms’ operations. The comparison in the ranking of events yielded an inter-rater 
reliability score with Cohen’s kappa of 0.95 for the top six cases for Indian companies and 
top six cases for foreign firms.  
Though some of the political and social strategies are likely to be hidden from the 
public domain, many of the discussions on political and social strategies of the foreign and 
domestic companies are also available on social media and online newspapers. Qualitative 
structured content analysis (Jauch et al., 1980; Gaur & Kumar, 2018) methodology was 
identified as the best method to analyze the data. It is a systematic and replicable technique 
used to abridge textual material into fewer content categories based on clear and well-defined 
rules of coding. According to Krippendorff (2012), six questions must be addressed in 
research that uses content analysis – Which data are analysed? How are they defined? What 
is the population from which they are drawn? What is the context relative to which the data 
are analysed? What are the boundaries of the analyses? What is the target of the inferences? 
We believe that the context of this research and the chosen cases are relevant to the 
phenomenon under evaluation and address these six questions effectively.  
This qualitative data collection methodology resulted in a completely n w data set 
with information on the political and social strategies of the case companies and few of their 
performance measures. The coding of the dataset was performed by two of the authors, who 
have a considerable amount of training and experience in content analysis and understand the 
Indian context. To further enhance the robustness of our analysis, we availed the help of two 
academics in strategic management with experience of EM research to separately recode a 
sample of our cases. We observed that inter-rate  reliability score using Cohen’s kappa was 
0.95 for the two co-authors’ coding and 0.80 for the two academics in strategic management. 
The overall inter-rater reliability score using Cohen’s kappa was 0.85 for coding by the 
independent academics and co-authors. Given the high inter-rater reliability scores, we were 
satisfied with the reliability of the coding process adopted in this project.  




To further understand the non-market strategies adopted by firms we used interviews 
to triangulate the information. We interviewed three Indian consultants working for foreign 
companies in India who were aware of the twelve cases discussed below and used the 
material from these interviews to further strengthen our analysis. The case-study approach 
also provides an opportunity to examine the less visible processes from multiple points of 
view (Yin, 2008, Eisenhardt, 1989, Corbin & Strauss, 1990).  
Data analysis 
Table 1 presents the selected cases. The final sample reflects both the diversity of 
challenges in the Indian business context as well as the novel social and political strategies 
adopted by the Indian and foreign firms in India. For example, we used the case study of 
Microsoft and how it provides technology-enabled products for social and economic 
development (Mehta and Kalra, 2006). We also included a case study of Unitech which was 
accused of corruption in obtaining licenses in the telecommunication sector (Shirodkar & 
Mohr, 2015).  
López et al. (2007) suggest that the long-term effects of CSR activities were observed 
only after four years of implementation of CSR strategies. Their study was over a seven-year 
period and focused on European firms. For this research, we define short-term as effects 
observed in 0-59 months and long-term effects are those observed over five years. For 
example, if a firm implements a political strategy, we examine the effect over the first 59 
months and classify it as a short-term effect, and next, we determine if this effect persists or 
changes over the following years and this translates into long-term effect. In the India, five-
year policy-making and electoral terms apply and they are an appropriate way to examine the 
effects of corporate policies and strategies in this context (George et al., 2014).  
We examine textual data for the three political strategies in our cases – information-
based, financial incentive, and constituency building (Shirodkar & Mohr, 2015), which have 
been identified in previous studies. Their success varied across the firms and the context in 




which they were used (Rajwani & Liedong, 2015; Doh et al., 2012). In terms of social 
strategies, we identify the following two strategies: philanthropy (including those involving 
civil society) and sustainability. 
Extant literature has used several different measures for performance, for example, 
Gómez,Bezares, Przychodzen & Przychodzen (2017) examine the impact of CSR activities 
on financial performance. Similarly, Ferreira (2017) observed that CSR activities influenced 
the financial performance of organizations. Relationship between CSR activities and mutual 
wellbeing of MNE and host market has been also widely examined in the EM context 
(Forcadell & Aracil, 2017). In this research, we identify the links between performance and 
socio-political activities  based on material from secondary sources.  We use the following 
four measures for performance – favourable (or unfavourable) legislative decision, lower (or 
higher) business risk, market share improvement (or decrease), and brand image 
improvement (or decrease). We examine the text to identify clear links between the strategy 
adopted and performance. For example, in order to be included in our study, we would expect 
to find clear mention of strategy and subsequent performance detail in the newspaper article 
or corporate literature such as company annual reports. We have discussed some of the 
examples in our findings section.  
(Insert table 1 here) 
Findings 
Impact of political and social strategies on short-term corporate performance  
Firms engage in various types of political strategy in India, and these choices depend on the 
activities of the companies. Enron, for example, actively engaged with the government and 
bureaucracy when it entered India’s power sector. It used information-based and financial 
incentives to engage with Indian regulators and politicians. Following the decision of the 
Indian regulators to open the power sector to foreign investment, India was expected to get 
over 10,000MW of new generating capacity between 1991 and 2000. In reality, only 




2,000MW of capacity was installed (Rufín et al., 2003). Much of the issues centered on 
bureaucracy and coordination, and Enron did face some of these issues during its initial days 
in India. It decided to work actively with the Indian government using financial incentive 
mechanism, both at the level of the firm as well as the US government in order to generate 
positive outcomes of its activities in India (Doh & Ramamurti, 2003). Yet, as the Energy 
Review Committee states, “The Committee has prima facie found infirmities in several 
decisions taken in respect of the Enron project at different points of time by successive 
governments and agencies in the Centre and state” (Energy Review Committee, 2001). In 
addition, some politicians have pointed out that “If the Enron decision has at all been 
detrimental, it is because of the haste with which phase 2 was cleared by the Shiv Sena-BJP 
(state) government. Now with the state having already entered into an agreement with Enron, 
the important thing is to resolve it amicably. A judicial inquiry will be an eyewash because 
it’s not an issue of corruption but that of perception” (Outlook, 2001).  
 We observe similar political strategies (information-based, financial incentive) by 
Monsanto, who worked directly with government and agricultural organizations in 
introducing genetically modified seeds rather than engaging in constituency building with 
local farmers. In the short-term, Monsanto was able to sell its seeds across India and generate 
positive outcomes from its investment (London and Hart, 2004, Stone, 2004). Neither 
Monsanto nor Enron engaged in social strategies to build legitimacy, and Enron took a rather 
confrontationist stance towards some of the oppositions it faced from local NGOs. As one 
report states “Corporations are overhyping ‘golden’ rice to pave the way for global approval 
of other more profitable genetically engineered crops” (Hindu, 2016). This was seen as 
corporate greed rather than a focus on local development and protection of domestic 
biodiversity.  
 Tata Motors adopted political strategies, mostly information-based and financial 
incentives, which involved working directly with the state government in India and had 




limited engagement with other local stakeholders. Tata Motors was induced to move from its 
previous location, Pantnagar, Uttarakhand to Singur near Kolkata by the favourable policies 
of the new government of West Bengal (Chandra, 2008). The state government engaged in 
these pro-business policies as it wanted to attract further investment into this relatively under-
invested state in India. This meant that, in the short-term, Tata Motors was able to acquire 
land and licenses for the operational purpose of the state government. The implications of this 
quick access meant that Tata Motors was able to establish its initial operations pretty quickly.  
On the other hand, companies like Unilever’s Indian subsidiary, Hindustan Lever 
Limited, proactively engaged in social strategies. Its philanthropic activities centered on 
creating sustainable and healthy living standards for Indian consumers (London and Hart, 
2004). The South Korean firms like LG Electronics were engaged in creating and applying 
sustainable practices in the Indian context (Han and Gundimeda, 2013). Instead of adopting 
top-down approaches, these South Korean companies worked with local stakeholders to 
create context-specific products and delivery models. Most of these activities were geared 
towards long-term economic and social development (Varadarajan & Kaul, 2017), and in the 
short-term, did not generate considerable tangible returns for these firms. This strategy in 
foreign markets is entirely different from the MNEs’ home country strategy where they seem 
to focus on short-termism (Kim et al., 2013). For example, Narsalay et al. (2012) mention in 
the case of Unilever that “Accordingly, financial targets – for example, profit growth – were 
not considered important metrics during this phase. Instead, the company examined three-to-
six-month targets on sales volume and the number of villages where the project was 
operational.”  
Impact of political and social strategies on long-term corporate performance  
In the long run, our cases show that political strategies are highly risky for firms. The 
uncertainty in the political systems of EMs coupled with institutional voids can greatly affect 
the outcomes of the employed political strategies (Khanna et al., 2005). This is especially true 




with regime changes and political-bureaucracy nexus. Data from our cases show that once the 
project in India was mired in controversies, Enron used political strategies once again to 
counteract its losses, yet these political strategies were counterproductive to its claims of 
fairness towards its disputes. For example, an article in BBC (2001) states that “In a veiled 
threat, the energy giant Enron has raised the specter of US sanctions against India in its 
dispute over the $2.9bn Dabhol power plant project.” These activities by Enron diluted the 
constituency building and the legitimacy its earlier activities had generated and had adverse
effects on the company’s corporate performance in India. Consequently, it was forced to 
withdraw its investment from India (Doh & Ramamurti, 2003).  
 Tata Motors was granted land without a great deal of scrutiny by the state government 
(Chandra, 2008). It turned out that the state government had allocated a highly fertile region 
of Singur for this industrial activity and when in later stages the state government faced 
opposition from the farmers, it further blundered in forcefully acquiring the land. Though the 
law applied as the Land Acquisition Act gave governments right to acquire land, in this case, 
it was heavily disputed by local farmers and NGOs. The state government forced those 
farmers unwilling to sell their land to surrender it for a very low price. This dispute caused 
Tata Motors to finally exit the state and set up operations in another Indian state. Even though 
it can be argued that domestic firms have a greater understanding of the domestic context, as 
this case demonstrates, it is not always the case, especially in big and regionally diverse EMs 
such as the Indian one.  Therefore, domestic companies can face as much opposition to their 
actions as foreign firms.  
Unilever’s Indian subsidiary’s social strategies involving philanthropic and 
sustainability activities, bore fruits in the long-term as they created an eco-system of micro-
entrepreneurs who waere embedded in the ethos of Unilever’s business. These micro-
entrepreneurs, called as Project Shakti Entrepreneurs, were the backbone of the system 
(Neath and Sharma, 2008). Interestingly, 95% of these entrepreneurs were women, and three 




out of four ended up crossing the poverty line. These projects had a positive impact on 
Unilever’s corporate performance. For example, Unilever (2005) press release on their CSR 
activities highlights the importance of this strategy in India which also had a long-term 
impact on the creation of women micro-entrepreneurs. It mentions that “Andhra Pradesh 
typically had a 3% success rate in creating entrepreneurs among women self-help groups 
before Project Shakti. This initiative has a 90% success rate”. Regarding financial gains, the 
press release also says, “The project started in a few pilot villages in Andhra Pradesh in 2000. 
In 2002, it expanded to two states and by the end of 2004 had grown to over 13,000 Shakti 
women entrepreneurs covering 50,000 villages in 12 states, selling to 70 million consumers. 
This represents a 30% increase in rural population reached”. According to Rangan and Rajan 
(2005), “Project Shakti’s turnover in 2004 was four-and-a-half times its turnover in 2003.” 
Linking political and social strategies to corporate performance 
We find evidence for the three political strategies in our cases – information-based, financial 
incentive, and constituency building (Shirodkar & Mohr, 2015). For example, when firms 
used the information-based and financial incentive to circumvent the process of constituency 
building (Enron, Monsanto, Tata Motors), the legitimacy of the political strategies was 
greatly reduced, and in the long-run, had a negative effect on corporate performance.  
We also find evidence for two social strategies used by our firms, namely, 
philanthropy (including those involving civil society) and sustainability. Firms like Unilever 
used philanthropic activities such as Project Shakti Entrepreneurs that were primarily directed 
towards social and economic development. In the long-term they also led to higher profits 
and market share for the company. Thus, these strategies positively affected the corporate 
performance in the long run. Similarly, firms like LG Electronics were inclined towards 
sustainability and philanthropy, and though in the short-term these did not seem to have much 
effect on profitability and legitimacy, in the long-term, LG Electronics wasable to learn from 
the Indian context and develop products suited to the local needs and uses. Immelt et al. 




(2009) found a similar case in GE Healthcare, which developed a cheaper ECG for Indian 
markets, delivering philanthropic as well as sustainability value while creating a new market 
for their products. 
To summarize, these non-market strategies have differing effects on corporate 
performance. In the short-term, political strategies are likely to have a more positive effect on 
corporate performance compared to social strategies. In the long-term, political strategies 
might have a negative effect on corporate performance, in case they collide or fall astray from 
social needs. We also found limited evidence of firms using the two strategies as 
complementary as they typically prefer one strategy over the other. The findings are 
presented in Table 2 and Figure 2.  
(Insert Figure 2 and Table 2 here) 
 
Discussions and Conclusions 
Scholars from different research domains have been keen to understand why firms engage in 
non-market strategies in host countries and what the impact of these strategies on firm 
performance are (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011, Frynas & Stephens, 2015; Gao & Hafsi, 2017). 
This paper aimed to examine how firms operating in EMs achieve a balance when adopting 
social and political non-market strategies. We applied a historical case study method to 
understand how firms would adopt social and political strategies to improve their 
performance in an EM context. 
The results indicate that political resources can have a short-term positive impact on 
corporate performance, but their success over time is limited. The political engagement with 
local politicians was beneficial for Enron to negotiate a profitable deal for their investment 
but in the long-term, the political relationship was cast as highly irregular. Aqueveque, 
Rodrigo and Duran (2018) have argued for the role of CSR activities in highly contentious 
industries and this is equally true in the case of EMs where issues such as energy security and 




pricing can prevail. This led Enron to accumulate losses and exit India (Doh & Ramamurti, 
2003, Kumar, 2004). This level of scrutiny is not limited to foreign firms as even domestic 
firms can come under a great deal of pressure to explain their political strategies. Their 
corporate performance may be negatively affected due to the adverse effect of rela ionships 
with political stakeholders.  
As seen in the case of Unitech, corruption and financial incentives to political parties 
can be detrimental to firm performance (Shirodkar & Mohr, 2015). Given the uncertainty in 
the EM business environment, many of these political engagements can be outsourced to 
consultants and firms can maintain a  arms-length relationship with political stakeholders. 
Though in the past, it has been suggested that firms should conduct their political issues 
management in-house rather than outsource it (Kaufman et al., 1989), studies also suggest 
that such a proposition does not take into account the variability in structural issues (Greening 
& Gray, 1994). We argue that in the context of EMs with a high degree of political 
uncertainties, it is beneficial to maintain these activities as extra-mural rather than integrate 
them into firms’ core capabilities. The major drawback of reliance on political resources by 
firms operating in EMs is the lack of political stability and fragmented polity. 
 On the contrary, social strategies are better enablers of long-term positive corporate 
performance as compared to political strategies. We observed that though in the short-term 
social strategies do not necessarily have a direct positive impact on corporate performance, in 
the long-term, such strategies have a positive effect. For example, the South Korean 
companies invest heavily in social strategies while developing their entry strategy in EMs 
(Han & Gundimeda, 2013). LG Electronics was keen to develop social strategies which were 
rooted in the requirements of the local population rather than to adopt a top-down approach to 
social strategies. They also worked with their employees to develop social strategies, which 
were beneficial to the local society. For example, 200 LG Electronics employees participated 
in an initiative to clean the river in New Delhi and staged a play to highlight the issues of 




water pollution in India (Mukherjee, 2010). This also kept the attrition low and improved 
corporate performance by engendering collaborative work environment. 
 We found limited evidence of firms using these two strategies simultaneously as firms 
typically adopted one strategy. Enron, for example, did not engage in social strategies and 
was entirely focused on developing strong ties with political stakeholders. It did not 
understand the implications of not engaging with NGOs that were actively working to have 
the project stopped due to Enron’s financial incentive driven approach to political strategy 
(Doh & Ramamurti, 2003). Similarly, there is little evidence that LG Electronics, which were 
engaged in social strategies, had n active political strategy in India (Han & Gundimeda, 
2013). While these results might indicate that firms usually define the boundaries of their 
non-market strategies, we argue that instead they need to think about strategic ambiguity and 
employ strategies to unify diverse stakeholders (Scandelius & Cohen, 2016). 
There are two possible explanations for these observations, one; it is possible that 
different industries may be prone to different engagement with political stakeholders. Some 
industries, e.g. infrastructure sectors (energy, dams, and transportation) might require much 
closer engagement with politicians. This is possibly due to the higher investment risk and 
may also be triggered by the government being the primary customer. In the latter case, it is 
plausible to argue that while trying to meet the demands of the government as a client, firms 
may also seek support and assistance from the government in the hope to co-create value. 
Two, in the case of foreign firms, it might be the case of country-of-origin effect, e.g., US 
companies are used to lobbying for benefits from the government. Though lacking in nuance, 
some American companies might engage in political strategies without analysing the long-
term impact of their activities. Some authors examining Japanese MNEs have found out that 
firms’ engagement in EMs will very much depend on the political hazards that the firms may 
face in these markets (Delios & Henisz, 2000).  




The main limitation of this paper is that we have relied on few case studies to develop 
our conceptual model. We chose extreme cases of MNEs operating in the Indian context, 
which are relevant to the purpose of this research. The results might be somewhat different 
for medium – or small-sized foreign and domestic firms who engage only notionally with 
both social and political strategies. We also do not detect major differences in the social 
strategies of domestic and foreign MNEs, potentially indicating that firms employ global 
CSR practices. In the case of political strategies, we do not find major differences between 
those adopted by domestic and foreign MNEs, although there might be some more tacit 
nuanced diversity. This could potentially indicate that non-market strategies are very much 
context-dependent. This may well suggest that normative and cultural-cognitive institutions 
do indeed inform non-market strategies to a great extent. The case-study approach might not 
generate generalizable results so we suggest that future studies should conduct longitudinal 
and large scale surveys across EMs.   
In terms of the role of institutions in EMs, we have aligned with previous research 
suggesting that MNE activities are greatly influenced by the institutional system in these 
markets (Marinova, Child & Marinov, 2012), but we also suggest that firms acting as 
institutional entrepreneurs in these contexts can shape institutions (Kostova et al, 2008; 
Clegg, 2010) . We acknowledge that the conceptual model in this paper does not demonstrate 
this agency on the part of the firms and we suggest that further research is required in this 
area to examine the role of agency in firms’ socio-political activities.  
India is a big emerging market, but it may well differ from other EMs. For example, 
in Russia, which is known for the high degree of  government regulation over domestic and 
foreign investors, especially in selected economic sectors it may well be that if companies do 
not have political and social capital, their operations would either be rather difficult or 
impossible irrespective of the change of governments. It is possible that our argument is valid 
for countries in which the relationship between business and institutional entrepreneurship 




(with the government being the critical institutional actor) is in favour of business 
entrepreneurship. Thus, future studies could potentially conduct comparative studies across 
different industries by examining cases from multiple EMs. Lastly, we do not test the effect 
of home country on the strategies adopted by these firms. It is plausible to suggest that home 
country effects might be driving some of the observations noted in this paper (Delios & 
Heinsz, 2000), which is highly likely considering differences in institutions, business 
characteristics and culture. Future studies may examine both the home and host country 
effects on social and political strategies, considering that internationalising firms use different 
institutional and resource home country defined capital accessible to them (Child & 
Marinova, 2014), which affects their learning in host countries.  
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Table 1. Details of case studies used in this analysis 
Sr. No Company Country of Origin Event under analysis Number of text files 
1 Microsoft  USA It uses technology enabled products for social and economic development in 
India (Mehta and Kalra, 2006) 
404 
2 Hindustan Lever 
Limited (Unilever's 
India subsidiary) 
UK It uses a variety of suppliers to distribute its products and helps these partners 
to strengthen their capabilities (London and Hart, 2004, Neath and Sharma, 
2008) 
2607 
3 LG Electronics South Korea It runs medical clinics in the villages of India (Han and Gundimeda, 2013) 386 
4 Coca-Cola USA Water contamination in India (Hills and Welford, 2005) 1090 
5 Enron USA It encountered credibility issues with the local stakeholders (Doh and 
Ramamurti, 2003, Kumar, 2004) 
1500 
6 Monsanto USA Using its knowledge in genetic engineering, it wanted to change the agricultural 
industry and address the food and nutrition issues in the developing countries. 
Yet, the aｷヴﾏげゲ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ ﾗa ┌ゲｷﾐｪ ゲデWヴｷﾉW ゲWWSゲ デﾗ ヮヴﾗデWIデ ｷデゲ ｷﾐデWﾉﾉWIデ┌;ﾉ ヮヴﾗヮWヴデ┞ 
rights in modified seeds was a disaster for it in EM (London and Hart, 2004, 
Stone, 2004) 
6460 
7 Infosys  India It supports and encourages underprivileged sections of the society (Gautam 
and Singh, 2010) 
4978 
8 Wipro India It provides support for learning enhancement for underprivileged sections of 
the society (Gautam and Singh, 2010) 
2275 
9 Tata Steel India It works to improve the quality of the lives of its stakeholders and contribute to 
sustainability of the natural resources (Gautam and Singh, 2010) 
6730 
10 Satyam Computers India The accounting fraud of the firm overshadowed several other social strategies 
adopted by the firm (Mishra and Mohanty, 2014, Kripalani, 2009, George et al., 
1739 





11 Tata Motors India It cancelled its car manufacturing plant in West Bengal state, in the face 
of widespread farmer protests over land acquisition issues (Chandra, 2008, 
Mitra, 2011) 
1852 
12 Unitech  India Telecomm scandal (Shirodkar and Mohr, 2015) 1240 
 
Table 2. Results of our longitudinal case-study analyses 
Sr. 
No 




Political strategies (long-term) Social strategies (long-term) 
1 Microsoft  No  Yes (No effect) No Yes (Greater market penetration and market share, and 
use of Microsoft products among school users, 
generates new products – Mouse Mischief) 
2 Hindustan Lever 
Limited  
No Yes (No effect) No Yes (Greater market penetration and market share, and 
generation of women microentrepreneurs) 
3 LG Electronics No Yes (No effect) No Yes (Greater market penetration and share, and 
generation of new localised innovations and products) 
4 Coca-Cola Yes (Easy access to 
markets) 
No Yes (generated lot of negative press 
for the firm, loss of operations) 
No 
5 Enron Yes (Easy access to 
markets) 
No  Yes (generated lot of negative press 
for the firm, loss of operations) 
No 
6 Monsanto Yes (Easy access to 
markets) 
No  Yes (generated lot of negative press 
for the firm, loss of operations) 
No 
7 Infosys  No Yes (No effect) No  Yes (generate increased awareness of this products and 




services, generates new products) 
8 Wipro No Yes (No effect) No Yes (generate increased awareness of this products and 
services, generates new products) 
9 Tata Steel No Yes (No effect) No Yes (higher performance from lower employee 




Yes (Easy access to 
markets) 
Yes (No effect) Yes (generated lot of negative press 
for the firm, loss of operations) 
Yes (No effect) 
11 Tata Motors Yes (Easy access to 
markets) 
No Yes (generated lot of negative press 
for the firm, loss of investment) 
No 
12 Unitech  Yes (Easy access to 
markets) 
No Yes (generated lot of negative press 
for the firm, loss of operations) 
No 
* each cell indicates if the firm adopted political and/or social strategies and information in brackets indicates the effects of these strategies  
 
